We investigate the dynamics of a firm whose advertisements and sales contribute to its customers' stock of goodwill. An advertising campaign precedes the firm's sales when the marginal product of advertisement is sufficiently large (e.g., Amazon Kindle and Apple Macintosh), whereas sales of a new brand of a familiar product may start without advertising (e.g. Crocs shoes). When the firm chooses both advertising and sales policies, the optimal solutions can be divided into two groups typified by low and high demand elasticities. When demand elasticity is low, a massive increase in the quantity sold causes a considerable drop in the product's price. Therefore, the firm prefers to use advertising, rather than excess sales. With high demand elasticity, a massive increase in the quantity sold reduces the price only marginally, thus sales becomes a relatively cheap way to build up the stock of goodwill, compared with advertising.
Introduction
During the 1984 Super Bowl XVIII, the Apple Macintosh personal computer was introduced to the world in a TV commercial that cost 1.5 million dollars. Advertisement campaigns had also preceded the commercial marketing of the Amazon's Kindle on November 19, 2007 . Some products, however, are launched without a single advertisement but yet rapidly become well known with fast increasing sales, e.g., Crocs shoes. 1 Why did Apple launch an advertising campaign before sales began, whereas Crocs started sales without any advertisement? Under what circumstances are such strategies optimal? This paper addresses these questions as well as other similar ones.
To tackle these issues, we develop a dynamic model of a firm with market power that is engaged in production, sales and advertising. At every point in time, the firm faces a downward sloping demand curve, which shifts up and outward with an increase in the stock of customers' goodwill for the product -an intangible asset that is part of consumers' preferences and is assumed to contain knowledge on the true or alleged properties of the product. Both advertising and sales are controlled by the firm and contribute to the rate of growth of the stock of customer goodwill, where the firm's cost is a function of the firm's output and advertising at each point in time. We term the process by which sales affect goodwill "learning-by-buying", which, unlike learning-by-doing, 2 affects consumers' demand. The novelty of our approach lies in the considerations of alternative channels for demand creation and in the interplay between the different inputs, while explicitly addressing the tradeoffs between two inputs that contribute to this process -advertising and sales.
Introducing both advertisement and sales as inputs that generate goodwill brings to light the substitutability between the two. When the value of the marginal product of advertisement in generating goodwill is sufficiently large compared with the value of marginal product of sales, the firm may launch an advertising campaign prior to sales, a strategy typical to the introduction of new electronic gadgets such as the Amazon Kindle on November 19, 2007 , and the Apple Macintosh in 1984, as well as the introduction of brand drugs. On the other hand, when a firm decides to produce a new brand of a familiar product, it may decide to delay advertising because the value of the marginal product of advertisement is sufficiently small compared with that of sales. We predict that when the cost of diffusing knowledge through sales is sufficiently small, the introduction of the product leads to a coreperiphery structure where consumers at the core, who acquired the good in previous periods, supply knowledge to consumers at the periphery (i.e., word-of-mouth). With time, the core will expand. That is, the intuition derived by Galeotti and Goyal (2010) for diffusion of information among social networks caries over to our dynamic framework.
We assume more specific functional forms, which include constant demand elasticity, to derive additional testable hypotheses. The specific functional forms allow us to derive a tractable solution. Then, two distinct alternative strategies emerge along the optimal path, one for low demand elasticity and one for high:
• When the demand elasticity the firm faces is low, the firm starts its operations with a high level of advertising and gradually reduces it to the steady state level (e.g., brand drugs).
• In a solution typical for high demand elasticity, the firm begins with low levels of sales and advertising that gradually increase (e.g., Crocs).
• Although an increase in advertisement along the optimal path may cause sales to increase or decrease, it will always result in lower equilibrium prices.
The economic intuition of the difference between the solutions of high and low demand elasticity is as follows: A firm initially seeks a quick build-up of its stock of goodwill in order to quickly raise the demand for its product. When the demand elasticity is low, a massive increase in the quantity sold will cause a considerable drop in the product's price. Hence, in the low elasticity case, the firm prefers to build-up goodwill by using advertising rather than excess sales. In the case of high demand elasticity, however, a massive increase in the quantity sold reduces the price only marginally, thus learning-by-buying becomes a relatively cheap way to build-up the stock of goodwill.
In the literature, models view advertisement as a tool that is controlled by a firm and enhances consumers' demand for the firm's differentiated product and thus increases the firm's sales. Dorfman and Steiner's (1954) positive model is one of the first formal static models of an advertising monopoly. Most of the earlier advertising static models belong to the 'persuasive view' that assumes advertising changes the utility function and creates brand loyalty (e.g., Comanor and Wilson, 1974) . Another approach, known as the 'informative approach', assumes that advertisement facilitates purchases by carrying information to consumers. Ozga (1960) and Stigler (1961) laid the foundations to this methodology and Dukes (2004) elaborated on reasons for its variety of levels. A comprehensive survey of all this liter-ature can be found in Bagwell (2005) and references therein. 3 The paper relates to both approaches, because building on different assumptions will allow for different interpretations of the mechanism that enhances consumers' demand for the firm's differentiated product and thus increases the firm's sales.
Static models, however, cannot capture the effects that a firm's past performances have on its current performance, for which dynamic models have been created. One of the earlier dynamic models is the 1957 Vidale and Wolfe model, which maximizes the accumulated discounted net sales while changes in current sales are caused by advertising and depreciation. The concept of a stock of goodwill influencing sales was introduced by Nerlove and Arrow (1962) . According to their approach advertising accumulates into goodwill the same way that investment accumulates into capital stock. For details on the literature emanating from these two papers see, for example, Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi (1994) , and Feinberg (2001) . Another branch of the dynamic marketing literature concentrates on the process of diffusion of sales information by 'word-of-mouth' and 'repeated sales'. 4 In most of these dynamic models, however, the production process and demand considerations that constitute the main issues addressed by static models are ignored and only a single sales variable exists (which is actually the net revenue). 5 In this paper we include elements of both static and dynamic models discussed above. Our results demonstrate the importance of including these demand and production processes into our dynamic model. It turns out that our solution includes two different strategies for new firms: One strategy is for firms facing low demand elasticity and the other is for firms facing high demand elasticity. The strategies differ in the investment rate in advertising relative to sales during the initial phase of the firm's operations, and can be used to shed new light on different advertisement strategies observed among firms (e.g., Amazon Kindle versus Crocs 3 A third approach, presented by Bagwell (2005) , assumes advertising directly enters consumers' preferences in a manner complementary to the consumption of the advertised product (e.g., Stigler and Becker, 1977, Hochman and Luski, 1988) . According to this approach, the consumer buys advertisement as any other good, to furnish the knowledge of the properties of the good, and it serves as an input in the home production function. 4 For a comprehensive literature review, see Bass (1969) ; Sethi (1977) ; Dodson and Muller (1978) ; Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi (1994) ; Feinberg (2001) . 5 One of the exceptions is a paper by Hochman and Hochman (1975) , which extends Nerlove and Arrow's model to include advertising and goodwill stock as well as investment and capital stock. Another exception are Kalish (1985) and Horsky (1990) , in whose works prices are determined endogenously. Both Kalish and Horsky, however, do not refer to advertising or goodwill and instead diffusion and adoption of durable goods are captured by accumulated sales affecting current sales. Several papers examined the impact of advertising on product information and pricing (Butters, 1977 , Roy, 2000 , and Iyer et al., 2005 . In those papers, however, advertisement increases consumers information on the product and does not build goodwill.
shoes).
The model is described in Section 2 and we derive the general solution in Section 3. The optimal path to steady state for more specific functional forms is characterized in Section 4.
The Model
Consider a firm that produces and markets a unique good that no other firm is producing. Such a good may be either a differentiated product in an industry in which other firms produce close substitutes of the good with different brand names, or a product for which there are no close substitutes in the market and the firm is a monopoly. In both cases, the firm has market power, faces a downward sloping demand curve, and can generate the consumers' stock of goodwill (GW) to increase the quantity sold at a given price. Thus, X (t), the quantity of the firm's product demanded at time t, is a decreasing function of P(t), the price at time t, and an increasing function of the stock of GW prevailing at time t, A(t). Accordingly, X (t) = X (P(t),A(t)) , where ∂X ∂P < 0 and ∂X ∂A > 0. The elasticity of the current demand is defined as ε X,P = − ∂X ∂P P X and by assumption 1 < ε X,P < ∞. 6 For convenience, and without loss of generality, we choose X (t) and A(t) as the independent variables in the current demand function facing the firm so that the price becomes a function of the two of them, i.e., P(t) = P(X (t),A(t)) , ∂P ∂X < 0,
, is a stock variable generated by the firm's advertisement I and the quantity of its product sold, X, according to the following equation of motion:
The term g(X) in the above equation of motion (1) is the current sales multiplier in the generation of GW, where ∂g ∂X > 0. The contribution of current sales to the stock of GW may be due to the effect it has on the willingness of the customer to buy more of the product in the near future (i.e., repeated sales) or to tell others about the product he just bought and consumed, thus creating goodwill in others as well (i.e., word-of-mouth). The variable I (t) denotes advertisement, an investment in GW that is independent of the firm's sales. h(I) denotes the advertisement multiplier in 6 In an industry with many firms, in which each firm produces a unique good that is a close substitute for each of the other goods produced by the other firms, the demand elasticity that each firm faces is a finite number that is much larger than one, i.e., 1 ε X,P < ∞. If there is a single firm in an industry without close substitutes (i.e., a monoply), its demand elasticity is a number higher than one but not much higher, i.e., 1 < ε X,P ∞.
the generation of GW, where ∂h ∂I > 0. Advertisement increases consumers' true or alleged knowledge about the good consumed, and thus contributes to the stock of GW. The parameter ψ is the constant rate of GW decay as a result of forgetfulness and the introduction of newer products. The index (1 − A) measures the remaining potential of the firm's GW and in the equation of motion it implies decreasing returns to investment in the stock of GW. That is, the firm's ability to enhance the demand for its products is limited. Note that (1) implies that the maximum amount of GW is normalized to 1, and 0≤A(t) < 1, since, as A approaches 1,˙A becomes negative and A declines. Thus, A(t) is the proportion of maximum goodwill utilized by the firm to enhance the demand for its product.
To sum up the arguments: the GW, A, is affected by advertisement, I, and by learning-by-buying represented by the firm's output X. In addition, A is bounded between zero and one and displays decreasing returns to investment. The equation of motion, Eq. (1), expands Nerlove and Arrow (1962) and assumes that learningby-buying, 7 and not only advertisement, affects GW. The equation captures both effects: buyers of Crocs who inform others about the product they just purchased (learning-by-buying) or advertisements that increase consumers' knowledge about the electronic gadget.
The firm bears the costs of producing output X, C 1 (X) , as well as the cost of advertisement I, C 2 (I). Both cost functions have positive first derivatives and non-negative second derivatives. Accordingly, the current profit function, π (t), is
The discount rate in the economy is a given positive parameter r < 1. All variables are functions of time t, although in what follows t is omitted unless it is essential for understanding the equations. Accordingly, the variables of our model are A, a state variable with λ as its co-state, and the control variables X and I. Note that both X and I can only be non-negative.
We are interested in the optimal strategy of a firm around its inception, i.e., the solution beginning with A(0) = 0, and assume the firm maximizes the following inter-temporal profit function at t = 0, the time at which the firm is founded:
7 Note that for g(X)≡0 and h(I)≡I, we obtain an equation of motion similar to those obtained by Gould (1970) and by Vidale and Wolfe (1957) .
We adopt the plausible assumption of r≤ψ. That is, r, now standing for the alternative cost of aggregate consumption in terms of enhanced investment in the stock of GW, is smaller than the decay rate of GW, ψ.
The Model's Solution
We first derive the overall necessary conditions for any one of these three types of the model's solutions: a corner solution, an internal solution or a null solution. Appendix 6.1 presents the Hamiltonian and the conditions for an optimum solution, where an apostrophe in a superscript of a single-variable function designates the first derivative of the function, a multi-variable function with a variable in its subscript stands for the derivative of the function with respect to the variable, and a dot above a function denotes derivation with respect to time.
The necessary conditions specified in Section 3.1 are used to obtain two examples of corner solutions and to characterize in detail a model with specific functional forms as described in Section 4. It should be noted that in our model, there is always a maximum that satisfies the necessary conditions, i.e., there is always either an internal solution or a corner one. The null solution X (t) = I (t) = A(t) = 0 is always a local optimum and if costs are higher than benefits it is also the global optimum. In what follows, we characterize solutions with positive-valued variables.
Necessary Conditions
The differentiation of the Hamiltonian with respect to advertising I (see Condition 2 in Appendix 6.1), yields the (in)equality relating the shadow value of the marginal product of advertisement I, λh (I)(1 − A), to the marginal current cost, C 2 (I); i.e.,
where 0≤A < 1 and equality holds in (3) when I > 0. When advertising is positive, equality holds between
h (I)(1−A) , the imputed cost of a unit of˙A generated by advertising, and λ, the shadow price of a unit of GW.
The differentiation of the Hamiltonian with respect to the output X (Condition 1 in Appendix 6.1) yields the (in)equality between the sum of the marginal revenue of X plus the value of the marginal contribution of X to A, and the current marginal cost of X; namely,
where 0≤A < 1 and equality holds in Eq. (4) when X > 0. MR X (X,A) is the marginal revenue of X and MR X (X,A)≡ ∂(XP(X,A)) ∂X = P(X,A) + XP X (X,A). The marginal contribution of X to A is λg (X)(1 − A), and the current marginal cost
While a monopolistic myopic firm in a static model equates MR X to MC (X), i.e., produces the output X m , the firm in our dynamic model produces an output X o , where X o > X m . The additional marginal cost above the marginal revenue, at the optimal output X o , equals the shadow value of the marginal contribution of sales to the creation of future GW.
The rate of change of the shadow price,λ, is obtained by differentiating the Hamiltonian with respect to the stock of GW A (Condition 3 in Appendix 6.1) and is given by Eq. (5) below, for λ > 0.
where
is the marginal revenue of A. The two terms on the left-hand side of the second line of (5) are the rate of growth of the GW price,λ/λ, plus the current marginal revenue of GW, MR A , normalized by its price, λ. The first two terms on the right side of that same equation, r + ψ, are the maintenance costs per unit of GW and the last two terms measure the contribution to˙A of learning-by-buying, g(X), and advertisement, h(I). The necessary conditions (3), (4) and (5), the equation of motion (1), the initial conditions and the non-negativity restrictions specified in (2), together determine the solution of the maximization problem specified in (2).
The Model's Internal and Corner Solutions
From Eqs. (3) and (4) and after eliminating λ we obtain
Since 0≤A < 1, the term (1 − A) is positive and it was therefore eliminated from (6). The above equation states that the optimum can consist either of an internal solution in which both X and I are positive or of a corner solution in which either X or I disappear. If X > 0, then the shadow price of a unit of GW, λ, equals
(1−A) , whereas if I > 0, the shadow price λ equals
R(I)
(1−A) .
The Internal Solution
When at optimum, both I and X are positive, 0≤A < 1, and equality holds in (6) . This is a case of an internal solution. Additional conditions on the functions of the model, on top of the conditions assumed in Section 2, are needed to ensure the existence of an internal solution. Such additional conditions are henceforth assumed: (1) demand, P(X,A), is downward sloping, convex, and increases with advertisement, i.e., ∂P ∂X < 0,
∂X 2 > 0 and ∂P ∂A > 0; (2) the advertisement multiplier, h(I), increases with advertisement I, i.e., ∂h ∂I > 0, but at a decreasing rate, i.e., ∂ 2 h ∂I 2 ≤ 0 , and (3) the sales multiplier, g(X), increases with sales X, i.e., ∂g ∂X > 0, but at a decreasing rate, i.e.,
In an internal solution, the firm has two current policy instruments. The first is advertisement, I, which increases the future stock of GW, A, and thus increases the future price for a given quantity demanded and with it future revenues. The second policy instrument is the quantity sold of the product, X, with its double impact of (i) current revenue generation through sales, and (ii) the increase of the future stock of GW, A.
Accordingly, in the internal solution equalities hold for (3) and (4), from which we obtain,
The equality in (7) is between the marginal net cost of GW generated either by current sales or by current advertisement. By totally differentiating (7) we obtain 0 < ∂X ∂I | dA=0 and 0 < ∂X ∂A | dI=0 (Appendix 6.2). An increase in I results in consumers buying more of the good, as analogous to the law of demand whereby consumers buy more of a good when its price decreases. This follows from Eq. (13), assuming the demand of X is downward sloping and GW is held constant, i.e., ∂P ∂I | dA=0 < 0. In (3) we obtained λ as a function of I and A alone. By differentiating the expression with respect to time we now obtain,
Let
I be the elasticity of C 2 (the marginal cost of advertising) with respect to advertising, I.
Similarly, E h = h h I is the elasticity of h (the marginal advertising multiplier of GW) with respect to advertising. Then, by substituting λ from (3) and the elasticities E C 2 and E h defined above into (8) and rearranging terms, we obtaiṅ
Equation (9) implies that the rate of change,˙λ λ , is decomposed into two components: current and inter-temporal. The current component measures the net cost of the rate of change of advertising,˙I I , and the inter-temporal component measures the growth of GW,˙A, relative to the remaining growth potential of GW, (1 − A). By substituting (8) into (5) together with (1) and (3) we obtain the expression for the change over time in advertising, 8
for 0≤A < 1 and 0 < I. Later on we will characterize the internal solution by using the equations derived here.
Corner Solution I:
The relation between the (in)equalities of the necessary conditions and corner solution I is as follows: If at the optimum I (t) = 0 and X (t) > 0, then 0≤A(t) < 1, equality holds in (4), and (weak) inequality holds in (3). In this case a weak inequality holds in (6) as well, and the left-hand side of the equation, L(X (t),A(t)), and the right-hand side of (6),
If at time t, the left-hand side of (6), L(X,A(t)), is for all non-negative pairs (I,X) less than R(I), the equation's right-hand side, then the optimal solution at time t is a corner solution with I (t) = 0 and X (t) > 0. In other words, at time t, 8 When I = 0, either there is an inequality in (3) and then˙I = I = 0 or there is an equality in
, and thenλ in (5) must be positive for both λ and I to grow. Only then can we obtain (8) . Fromλ > 0 we obtain
) . For a sufficiently small A, the term in the RHS is negative, but˙I cannot be negative when I = 0. Hence, in an internal solution, I cannot be zero for a small A, i.e., I is discontinuous at I = 0. Therefore, I = 0 =⇒˙I = 0. Note that we can also show that˙I(A = 1,I = 0) = 0.
the firm produces a positive quantity of good X and does not advertise. The imputed cost of a unit of GW, then, equals
L(X(t),A(t))
(1−A) . To illustrate such a solution, consider the following example:
Example 1 First, let h(I) = I 2 + 2I and C 2 (I) = I 2 + I. Fo r I > 0, the right-hand side of (6), R(I) = 1+1/2I 1+1/I , is monotonic increasing with I in the domain 0 < I < ∞, and obtains its values in the interval 1/2 < R(I) < 1.
Second, we designate C 1 (X) = 2X, g(X) = X and
The left-hand side of (6) is L(X,A) = 1 4 − A(10 − 2X). When A = 0, the price function is P(X) = 1.75, i.e., the firm is facing a demand curve of infinite elasticity and is therefore a price-taker. The left-hand side of (6), L(X,0) = 0.25 and is smaller than R(I), the right-hand side of (6), for all I. Therefore, at A = 0 the solution is a corner solution with X (t = 0) > 0 and I (t = 0) = 0. Due to learning-by-buying, the initial sale creates a positive GW, A. Although once A is positive, there are sufficiently large X s so that L(X,A) is larger than R(I = 0) = 0.5, and there may be an internal solution where both X and I are positive. Initially, I (0) = 0 and X (0) > 0, which is a corner solution.
Such a pattern can be traced in markets of differentiated products with many brands and high demand elasticity for each brand. A firm in such a market will first distinguish its product through learning-by-buying, but will begin advertising at a later stage. Initially, it is cheaper to use sales to build up the stock of GW, in contrast to advertising. However, since the marginal benefit from learning-bybuying declines with sales, a firm will begin advertising at a later stage. Examples of such firms include start-up restaurants, small stores, confection manufacturers and other small producers of differentiated products, as well as experience goods or status/fashionable goods (e.g., Crocs shoes). 9 
Corner Solution II:
If at the optimum, at time t, there is a corner solution in which I (t) > 0, X (t) = 0 and 0≤A(t) < 1, then L(0,A(t)), the left-hand side of equation (6), is larger than the equation's right hand side, R(I (t)). Equality will hold in (3) and (weak) inequality will hold in (4) .
If at the optimum, at time t, the left-hand side of (6), L(X,A(t)) where 0≤A(t) < 1, is larger than the equation's right-hand side, R(I) for all non-negative pairs (I,X), then the optimal solution is a corner solution with I (t) > 0 and X (t) = 0. Namely, at time t the firm advertises but does not produce, and the imputed cost of a unit of GW is R(I)
In this case, since at time t = 0 A(0) = 0, there is no demand for the firm's product and R(I) < L(X,0), for all X and I. Therefore, at time t = 0 the firm advertises but does not sell. It may begin to sell only when the GW exceeds the level of A = 0.01, which is the level at which the demand price may justify sales. Indeed, when A≥0.01 there are positive pairs (X,I) for which equality prevails in (6).
Such a pattern is typical to the introduction of new gadgets such as the Amazon Kindle and the Apple Macintosh, as well as the introduction of brand drugs. In such cases, the beginning of sales is preceded by a promotion campaign. The firm begins advertising, but not sales, because initially the marginal product of advertisement is sufficiently large, compared with sales. Advertisement is used to build the stock of GW and to create demand. As soon as the firm creates enough demand, it begins sales. At this point, the marginal benefit from sales equals the marginal benefit from advertisement, which equals the imputed cost of the stock of GW.
In the next section we introduce specific functional forms into our model in order to gain more insight into the behavior of the firm along the optimal path in an internal solution, and we relate the marginal cost of generating GW from sales to the demand elasticity.
The Model with Specific Functional Forms
In this section we assume specific functional forms that satisfy the conditions for an internal solution. These functional forms are sufficiently general to typify an industry, yet they are sufficiently specific to allow full characterization of the model's solution.
First, we assume that the inverted demand function, P(X,A), is the constant elasticity function P = P 0 (1 + sA)X −γ , where P 0 ,γ, and s are given parameters, P 0 > 0, 0 < γ < 1 and 1≤s < 10. The parameter s measures the maximum capacity of goodwill. Note that the demand elasticity, ε X,p = 1 γ , fulfills 1 < 1 γ < ∞. 10 Next we assume that g(X) = βX and h(I) = αI where α and β are positive given parameters. The cost functions are C 1 (X) = bX and C 2 (I) = c 2 I 2 where c is a given positive parameter. The solutions to our maximization problem, using the above specifications, is internal and has no corner solutions (see Appendix 6.3), and yields the current quantity and price of
respectively (see Appendix 6.4.1). We calculated the singular curves in Appendix 6.4.2 and showed that although along the optimal path a change in the current stock of GW does not affect the equilibrium price, a change in advertisement does. An increase in advertisement, I (t), reduces the price, resulting in a movement along the demand curve. The reason for this is that at each point in time, the imputed cost of GW generated by advertisement, R(I), is equated with the imputed cost of sales, i.e., L(X,A) (see Eq. (6)), and ∂R(I) ∂I > 0. However, sales and advertisement also contribute to the future stock of GW (Eq. (1)), and an increase in the future stock of GW shifts the demand curve up and to the right.
The layouts and slopes of the two singular curves˙I = 0 and˙A = 0 in the [A,I] are calculated in Appendix 6.5. Cases I and II below describe the two typical solutions to our model with specific functional forms. Case I includes models whose demand elasticities are relatively low, i.e., 1 < ε Xp ≤ , where x i is the quantity of the firm's product consumed by household i and z i stands for all other goods consumed by the household. Then, the inverted demand function, P 0 (1 + sA)X −γ , is the inverted aggregate demand function of the community of N, where P 0 = K 0 (1 − γ)N γ and X = ∑xi. Alternatively, such a demand function can be derived assuming the firm's output and its advertising are inputs into a commodity produced and consumed by the households (see Stigler and Becker, 1977 , and also Becker and Murphy, 1993). 
Case I:
Case I is depicted in Figure 1 . The intersection of the two singular curves,˙I = 0 and˙A = 0, yields the steady state point (I * ,A * ). The optimal path of a new firm depicted in Figure 1 for A 0 < A * is characterized by initial high advertising expenditure. As the stock of GW increases due to advertisement and learning-by-buying, advertising declines. The quantity sold may, however, increase or decrease while the GW increases. The reason for this ambiguity is that while A increases along the optimal path and shifts the demand curve up and to the right resulting in a larger X, I declines along the optimal path resulting in a movement along the demand curve and a smaller X, all else being equal. These two effects leave the end result of X ambiguous. The price, however, increases along the optimal path (as indicated by Eq. (20) in Appendix 6.4.1).
Low demand elasticity products are often essential goods produced by a few firms in markets that are difficult to enter. An example of a low demand elasticity product is Lipitor, a prescription cholesterol-reduction drug. Lipitor is an essential drug protected by a patent. Airplanes are another example of a Case I product. Note that potential buyers at which these firms' advertisement are aimed are not the general public but a specific part of it. In the case of a new drug, the targeted population are medical doctors, and in the case of new airplanes, the target population are aviators and aviation corporations. .
Figures 2a and 2b depict the solution of this case, in which γ is relatively low. In both figures, the optimal path of a firm with initial zero GW starts from low levels of advertising and sales that increase with the increase in GW. In Figure 2b , where the steady state is to the left of A n , advertising and sales increase monotonously towards steady state. In Figure 2a , on the other hand, the steady state is to the right of A n ; advertising, I, overshoots its steady state level I * and approaches it from above. Note that the optimal path on the right-hand side of the steady state point in Figure 2a (Figure 2b) is the mirror image of the optimal path on the left-hand side of the steady state point in Figure 2b (Figure 2a) .
The high demand elasticity that prevails in Case II is typical of differentiated products, where all brands of a differentiated product are close substitutes of each other and each brand is produced by a different firm. Consequently, each firm faces a demand curve of high elasticity and has limited monopoly power. Examples of perishable goods markets with high demand elasticity are those of prepared food items, confections, clothing, and commercial airline flights. Examples of durable goods with high demand elasticity include condos, cars, and inexpensive watches.
A question now arises as to the difference between the optimal paths in Case I and Case II? When answering this question we should first note that a massive build-up of GW through learning-by-buying requires sales beyond the myopic equilibrium level of sales. In Case I, since the demand elasticity is greater than, but close to 1, a sizable increase in sales entails a considerable price reduction (i.e., the marginal cost from generating GW is high). A build-up of GW in Case I by learning-by-buying will, therefore, drive the price level far below the price of maximum current profits, thus rendering learning-by-buying far more expensive than advertising. Accordingly, in our model, the initial build-up of a GW stock in Case I is done by advertising and as sales and GW stock grow, advertising gradually declines. In Case II, in which demand elasticity is high, the reverse is true and a massive expansion of sales causes only a slight reduction in price, rendering the learning-by-buying process the preferred engine for building up initial GW. This suggests that the introduction of competition may cause a firm to reduce advertising, but to increase sales (resulting in lower prices), because the demand faced by a firm becomes more elastic. 11 
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the dynamics of advertising and sales policies of firms that are seeking to maximize profits and facing downward sloping demand. Sales, as well as advertisement, contribute to the stock of goodwill, which affects consumers' demand. Then, if consumers have no or little knowledge about the nature of the product, the firm may launch an advertising campaign prior to sales, a typical strategy employed by electronic gadget companies and brand drug companies, among others. Examples include the introduction of the Apple Macintosh in 1984 and the Amazon Kindle in 2007. On the other hand, when a firm decides to produce a new brand of a familiar product, circumstances exist in which the firm should commence production and sales, and postpone advertising to a later stage. Examples include the introduction of Crocs shoes in 2002. When the firm chooses both advertising and sales, it can be shown that the optimal solution is a function of the demand elasticity.
This paper was an attempt to model the affect of current advertisement and sales on future sales, while considering the two in the same model, and thus exploring the interplay between quantity sold, advertising, and pricing. In future work we plan to further understand the implications of the analysis and its empirical relevance by reinterpreting goodwill as a preliminary input and transitioning to the relationship between the remaining observable variables: demand elasticity, sales, prices, advertising, and profits. This will allow us to further empirically assess the model's results.
Appendices

The Hamiltonian
Let H (t) designate the Hamiltonian formulated from L (0) below:
where δ (t) and η (t) are the Kunn-Tucker multipliers associated with the two inequalities. Three conditions then follow:
1.
∂H ∂X = P X (X,A)X +P(X,A)−C 1 (X)+λg (X)(1 − A)+η = 0, where η≥0 and ηX = 0.
2.
∂H ∂I = −C 2 (I) + λh (I)(1 − A) + δ = 0, where δ≥0, and δI = 0.
The singular curves
By totally differentiating (7) we obtain,
From (12) we obtain the following two derivatives (Eqs. (13) and (14)):
where MR X is a function of X and A only. The inequality in (13) is proved as follows: Since the first-order derivatives g (X), h (I), C 1 (X) and C 2 (I) are positive, the second order derivatives of the cost functions C 1 and C 2 are also positive and the second order derivatives of h and g are non-positive, it follows that the numerator of the equation above is positive. Since C 1 (X) − MR X (X,A) must be positive due to the non-negativity of λ in (4) and because
is negative due to the negative slope of the demand curve, the denominator of the equation above is also positive. Positive numerator and denominator imply that the whole expression is positive.
In a similar way we obtain (14) below,
= (g (X))
The inequality in (14) is proved similarly to the proof of the inequality in (13).
Nonexistence of Corner Solutions in the Model with Specific Functional Forms
In this appendix, we argue that the two conditions in the general case for Corner Solutions I and II in section 3.2, are not fulfilled in the solution to our specific functional forms model. The revenue function is R(X,A) = P 0 (1 + sA)X 1−γ , with marginal revenue functions, MR X = P 0 (1 − γ)(1 + sA)X −γ = (1 − γ)P(X,A) and MR A = P 0 sX 1−γ . Substituting the above in (2) we obtain the Lagrangian L s (0) in (15), for the specific functional forms model.
To show this we substitute the parameters of the specific functional forms model for A = 0 into (6) to obtain (16),
In Corner Solution II initially advertising I (0) > 0 and X (0) = 0. For this outcome to occur L(0) in (16) must be greater than R(I). However, since in (16) L(X = 0) = −∞, there is no non-negative I, for which R(I) < −∞. This means that in our specific example, advertising without production is never optimal. Initially, i.e., when A(0) = 0, Corner Solution I has only production and no advertising; hence, the initial advertising must be I (0) = 0. Substituting this initial investment into (16) yields
Since λ (t = 0) is non-negative, the triplet X (t = 0) = X min , I (t = 0) = 0 and λ (t = 0) = 0, is the only possible corner solution. 12 However, with positive parameters in(16), a whole range of X > X min and positive I and λ exist, which constitutes feasible interior solutions. The optimal solution is, therefore, an interior solution, possibly with positive X and I. 13 
Specific Functional Forms 6.4.1 The Solution of the Model with the Specific Functional Forms
We first compute the current quantity and price of the product by substituting the specific functional forms specified into (7). We obtain,
12 Note that x must be equal to x min (0), and this solution is technically not a corner solution since equality holds in (16) . 13 However, if b, for example, is sufficiently small, x is sufficiently large and x, I = 0 and λ = 0, can constitute the optimal solution. Note that in this case, I = 0 and λ = 0 for all t, and the solution is entirely myopic. Ye t , this solution is not a typical corner solution since for all t equality holds in (16) . Equation (17) can be used to show that on the equilibrium path an increase in advertisement results in more sales, i.e., a larger X. Since I cannot be negative, the lower bound of the quantity sold is X min (A) = P 0 (1−γ)(1+sA) b 1 γ and since X must be finite there is an upper bound of advertising I max = bα βc . It should be noted that I max is independent of γ, and has the same value for all γ. Therefore,
From (18) we obtain,
Note that by substituting X into P = P 0 (1 + sA)X −γ we obtain the price along the optimal path as a function of I alone as follows:
where ∂P ∂A = 0 and ∂P ∂I < 0.
The Singular Curves
The characterization of the model's solution is done by the technique of phase diagrams: in the (A,I) plane we plot the singular curves˙I = 0 and˙A = 0 and their intersection, the steady state point. We will then determine the direction of movement over time on the (A,I) plane and use this information to find the optimal path to the steady state. At first we calculate the equations of the singular curves. By substituting the specific functional forms into (10) and equating the result to zero, we obtain the singular curve˙I = 0.
where 0 < I < I max . By substituting the specific functional forms into (1) and equating the result to zero we obtain the singular curve˙A = 0,
from which we obtain the following expression for A as a function of I and X along the curve˙A = 0,
Consequently, 0≤A|˙A =0 < 1, and an increase in sales, X (t), and advertisement, I (t), results in more GW, i.e., To determine the slope of˙I | I>0 = 0, we differentiate totally the equation in (21) to obtain TD below,
By substituting the first term that multiplies dI above, which is also the first term in (21) , with the second term in (21) and then substituting for X and its partial differentials with respect to I and A from (19) and (17) while keeping in mind that I max = bα βc , we obtain,
The above equation implies,
Consider the denominator in (24) , which is a multiplication of two terms of which the first is always positive. The second term in the multiplication is negative when γI max < I < I max and positive when I fulfills 0 < I < γI max . At I = γI max the last term of the multiplication in the denominator vanishes and with it the whole denominator.
Since X (I = 0) > 0, it follows that A(I = 0)|˙I =0 must be equal to 1 for equation ( Suppose the numerator in (24) is positive for all I, 0≤I≤I max and A(I), 0≤ A(I)≤1 (e.g., when γ≥ s 1+s ) and let A(γI max )|˙I =0 be the value of A in˙I = 0 when I = γI max . Then, for each A such that A(γI max )|˙I =0 < A≤1 there are two I s which satisfy (21). For A s such that A < A(γI max )|˙I =0 , there are no I s that belong to˙I= 0 and the curve does not exist there. In other words, for A, A(γI max )|˙I =0 < A≤1, the curve˙I = 0 has two branches: in the upper branch I and A are both increasing, and in the lower branch, when I is decreasing, A is increasing. 14 We now extend the investigation of the curve˙I= 0 to include cases in which the numerator of dI dA |˙I =0 in (24) is negative. First we find out when the numerator of (21) is positive or negative. The first term in the numerator is always positive and the second term is non-negative if From here on we adopt the plausible assumption r≤ψ. The numerator of 14 To find out when the curve˙I = 0 intersects the I axis we do the following.We substitute A = 0 into (21) to obtain I = αs c(r+ψ)
. Next, we change the variable I into a variable θ so that I = θI max = θ bα βc . The resulting equation in θ is: ≤1, which means that the curve˙I = 0 intersects the I axis twice when m < 0.25. If m > 0.25 there is no real solution to θ which means that˙I = 0 does not intersect the I axis and the line˙I = 0 is not defined over small A and never reaches the I axis. When γ = 1/2 the situation is essentially the same. In other words we may have two or more intersection points of˙I = 0 with A = 0, one intersection point or none at all. 
The sign of Num is characterized by the following cases in which we make the plausible assumption r≤ψ.
. In this case all the terms in the numerator are positive for all feasible A as we already showed above. Note also that in this case η p,X = γ≥η p,A = sA 1+sA ≤ s 1+s , for all 0 < A < 1, where η p,X is the price elasticity with respect to the quantity demanded, and η p,A is the price elasticity with respect to the GW.
Case I 2 :
≤γ < s 1+s . Like case I 1 , Num in this case is positive for 0 < A≤1. To see that, first note that Num is positive for A = 1 for all γ, because then sA and (−s) cancel each other out and the remaining terms are positive. Furthermore, continuity implies that for each γ there are feasible A s sufficiently close to 1 for which Num is positive. Next, we find out if and when Num changes sign when γ < s 1+s . Since the numerator is continuous in A, to change signs it must vanish at some feasible A, say 0 <¯A n (γ) < 1, so that for A >¯A n (γ) the numerator is positive and for A <¯A n (γ) the numerator is negative. We solve¯A n (γ) from the second order equation in A below, in which the numerator of Num is equated to zero,
The above is an equation in A 2 and therefore may have zero, one or two solutions of A in the relevant range (0,1). If there is no solution in the relevant segment (0,1), Num does not change sign. If there is a single solution in the relevant range the sign changes once and if there are two solutions the sign changes twice. The solution of the above equation is given below in (25),
From here on we adopt the plausible assumption r≤ψ. The numerator of From (1) it can be verified that˙A vanishes at A = 0 for I negative, i.e., the intercept of the curve˙A = 0 is negative. On the other hand, when A is close to, but less than 1,˙A vanishes for 0 < I < I max . . To prove this, consider (22) from which we obtain (βX + αI) = ψ A (1 − A) .
The right-hand side of (27) can obtain any value in the interval (0,∞) and is a monotonic increasing function of A. The expression βX min (A 0 ) is a positive number equal to the value of X when I = 0. Thus, I solved from (27) for an A that fulfills βX min (A = 1) < ψ A (1−A) , is positive. The above analysis implies that the curvė A = 0 must intersect the A-axis at a point A, 0 < A < 1.
When A approaches 1 from below, the expression, (βX + αI) in˙A = 0 must approach infinity to offset the effect of the decreasing (1 − A). Note that for the expression (βX + αI) to approach infinity I must approach I max , since then X approaches infinity. Thus, the curve˙A = 0 ends in (I = I max ,A = 1).
Consider now the slope of˙A = 0 in the interval (A,1). First, replace The first term in the expression above is positive while the next two terms are negative. The first term is dominant when A is close to zero, the second term becomes dominant when A is close to 1. Since the denominator of dI dA |˙A =0 is always positive, when the numerator is negative the slope dI dA |˙A =0 is positive. For small A s, the values of I in the curve˙A = 0 is negative. Therefore, for the curve˙A = 0 to intersect the A-axis its slope must become positive already for negative I s. Once the slope becomes positive for a given A it remains positive for all larger A s.
Thus in Figures 1 and 2a the curve˙A = 0 intersects˙I= 0 at the lower branch with a negative slope. In Figure 2b , the two curves intersect where both have a positive slope.
Determining the Direction of Growth
Next we proceed with the evaluation of the directions of growth in time of A and I. We first differentiate˙A in (15) with respect to I to obtain ∂˙A ∂I | dA=0 below,
This implies that in Figures 1 and 2 , above the curve˙A = 0,˙A is positive and below the curve˙A is negative, as indicated by the horizontal arrows. Next we substitute the values of the specific example into (10) and differentiate the resulting˙I with respect to A, to obtain,
for I > 0.Then, by substituting ∂X ∂A from (19) into ∂˙I ∂A | dI=0 above and assuming 1 − ε < A < 1 for ε sufficiently small, we obtain,
Equation (29) implies that for values of A sufficiently close to but still smaller than 1,˙I is positive to the right of the curve˙I = 0 and negative to the left. Note that the sign of˙I reverses itself, if and only if it crosses the singular curve˙I = 0. These two characteristics are reflected in the direction of the vertical arrows as depicted in Figures 1 and 2 . The intersection (I * ,A * ) of the two curves,˙I = 0 in (21) and˙A = 0 in (22), yields the steady states depicted in Figures 1 and 2 . The optimal path that leads to the steady state is determined by the directions of the arrows.
In case I, the singular curve˙I = 0 in Figure 1 has two branches that connect at point (γI max ,A(γI max )) where its slope is infinite. The slope of the lower branch of the curve is negative while the upper branch has a positive slope. Both branches of˙I = 0 terminate at A = 1, the upper branch at I = I max and the lower at I = 0. The singular curve˙A = 0 in Figure 1 starts from the A-axis at A = A > 0 and ends at (I max ,1) at the upper right hand corner and its slope is always positive.
On the other hand, in case II (which is depicted in Figures 2a and 2b ) the two branches of the singular curve˙I = 0 are separated. The lower branch is bellshaped with a peak at A n and the upper branch is U-shaped with its bottom also at A n . As in case I, the singular curve˙A = 0 intersects the lower branch of˙I = 0 at the steady state point (I * ,A * ). In Figure 2a the steady state is to the left of A n and in Figure 2b it is to the right.
